This paper studies, as a continuation of previous work [8), an optimal stopping problem without recall in which the decision-maker observes a sequence of iid bivariate random variables which appear sequentially one by one in a Poisson manner. The problem can be interpreted as deciding to buy a house which has the two-dimensional worth, for example, the values for husband and for his wife. The concept of equilibrium neutral functions is introduced, and by using it an explicit solution of the problem is derived by means of finding a unique solution of some simultaneous differential equations. Some examples are included to illustrat,e the computations required by an "equilibrium neutral strategy".
Introduction and Summary
Let (X., Y.), i = 1, 2, ..• , n, be independently and identically distrib- to be known by the decision-maker. When a random variable is observed it is either accepted, or rejected never to be accepted later. Only one observation, can be accepted, and if the player has not accepted until the final observation, then he is obliged to accept this one.
For univariate random variables Xi' many authors have studied the problem of finding the stopping policy which maximizes the expected value of the observation accepted. (See, for reference DeGroot [2, Chapter 13]). There far as the present author knows his study [8] is the only one biginning work.
In [8] the concept of equilibrium neutral values was introduced, and by using it a stopping policy was derived which "optimizes ll , in some appropriate sense, the expected values of the observation accepted.
In the present paper, we shall investigate some consequences of deleting the requirement that the number of the offers (i.e., length of the planning period) is deterministical1y known and fixed. We will consider the optimal stopping problem in which the offers are presented sequentially one by one and randomly in a Poisson manner during some given time interval. Associated with the offer newly presented at time, is a bivariate random variable (X , , Y J, which takes on the values (x , y). Whenever an offer is presented with
values (x , y ) the decision-maker is asked to decide whether he accepts the , , offer and terminates the process, or rejects the offer and continues his search process. We assume that any decision must be made immediately after respectively, such that ° < E(X) = ~ < 00 and ° < E(Y) = v < 00. Extension of the theory to the three-or-more dimensional random variables is immediate at least conceptually.
If one acts in disregard of the values of Yi'S and wants to maximize the expected value of the observation X accepted, then his problem is solved as follows (See, Karlin [6], Albright [lJ and Sakaguchi [9] ) : Let uO(t) = the expected payoff obtainable by following an optimal policy under the condition that t units of time remain before the deadline and any offer has not been accepted previously.
Then uO(t) satisfies the differential equation
where TF(z) is the mean-shortage function defined by
We find that (1) has a unique solution, whi,~h is non-negative, concave and non-decreasing.
Similarly if one acts in disregard of t.he observations of Xi's and wants to maximize the observation of the Y accepted, define vO(t), similarly as in uO(t), interchanging the roles of X and Y. Then vO(t) satisfies
and an optimal policy is described by (3), 1fith x and u (t), replaced by y and vO(t), respectively.
Our main concern in the problem we wan'~ to discuss in the present paper is to find how to stop optimally, in some appropriate sense, if we cannot be in disregard of anyone variable and have a think of both of X and Y with equal importance. An outline of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 the concept of equilibrium neutral functions is introduced, and by using it an explicit solution of the problem is derived through finding a unique solution of some simultaneous differential equations.. The reduction to a non-cooperative non-zero-sum differential game is suggested. In Section 3 some examples are included to illustrate the computations required by an "equilibrium neutral strategy".
Equilibrium Neutral Strategy.
We shall consider a class of stopping policies in which the decisionmaker has a pair of "neutral" functions u(t) and v(t), in the sense that his search process is terminated by accepting the first offer. such that X > u(t) T= andY ~ v(t), where t is the time remaining before the deadline at the T instant of the arrival of the T-th offer.
In what follows in this paper, we occasionally use the term "time", which means the future time remaining before the deadline. No confusion will occur by this. Let ~[tlu(·), v(·)] be the expected payoff from the observations of X's under the condition that any offer has not been accepted previously by
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When to Stop: Bivariate Target Values
Now borrowing the concept of the equilibrium from non-cooperative game theory, we want to find a pair of neutral functions u*(·) and v*('), such that a unilateral departure from this pair by either u(') or v(') will result in a lower payoff. More precisely, for any t > 0.
A pair of functions u*(·) and v*(·) is said to constitute an equilibrium neutral strategy if it satisfies (4). 
with the initial conditions u(O) = v(O) = 0, and we shall assume that our bivariate distribution H(x, y) is such that the equations have a unique solution. Then we prove the following :
Theorem Under the above mentioned assumption, let (u*('), v*(·)) be the unique solution of Eqs (5) with u(O) = v(O) = 0. Then this is an equilibrium neutral strategy. Moreover we have, for any t ~ 0,
Proof For any pair of neutral functions u(·) and v('), define
Then considering what can happen in some small time interval ~t and employing the Principle of Optimality in dynamic programming, we have the expression Copyright © by ORSJ. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
where hex, y) is the pdf of the cdf H(x, y). If H(x, y) is discontinuous, a slight modification will be needed.
Rearranging terms, dividing both side!> by lit, and taking the limit as lit ~ a, we obtain (8) .
Note that Mtltlv(.)] is equal to the optimal choice of the neutral value for X at time t, provided that the neutral funetion v(·) for Y will be employed thereafter.
Also a similar argument as in above gives
and that M~[tlu(')] equals the optimal choice of the neutral value for Y at time t, provided that the neutral function u(·) for X will be employed thereafter.
Let (u*(·), v*(·)) be a unique solution of the simultaneous differential
with u(a) = v(a) = a. This is equivalent to (5) by interchanging the order of the integrations. Then, by (8) and (8' 
Since a pair of neutral functions u*(·) and v*(.) satisfies (4) , if and only
it follows that (u*(.), v*(.)) is an equilibrium neutral strategy and (6) is true. This completes the proof of the theorem. 0
The above theorem implies the following important fact : the pair of functions u(') and v(.) defined by the simultaneous differential equations (5), or equivalently, (9), plays two roles. (Hereafter we shall omit the asterisks in u*(t) and V*(t).) First it constitutes an equilibrium neutral strategy for the search process, and secondly, (u(t), v(t)) is the equilibrium expected payoffs for a play of the remaining period t. In a later section we shall show that some elementary bivariate distributions give, relatively easily, explicit solutions of the simultaneous differential equations (5). Remark Our derivation of the equations (8) and (8') suggests that the problem we are considering is nothing but a non-cooperative non-zero-sum differential game, in which the payoffs to player 1 and player 2 are ~(T) and M 2 (T), respectively, the differential equations are ~ (t) AS 00 (x ~ (t))dx r 00 h(x, y)dy ,
and the controls satisfy, in 0 
Corollary 1 Each of u(t) and v(t) is non-decreasing and concave in
Proof. The proof will be shown for u(t) only. Non-decreasing property is evident from (5) and non-negati vi ty of the mean-shortage function. Also (9) gives A-lu"(t) = {u' (t) a:
in which all of the two integrals and the two derivatives are non-negative.
This proves the concavity of u(t). Since u~t) and vO(t) satisfies the differential equations (1) and (1') respectively, the assertion of the corollary follows. Let Fly] denote, the conditional cdf of X given y, and G [x] , that of y given x. Sometimes it is convenient to rewrite (5) as
These expressions will be used in the following examples.
is a bivariate Bernoulli random variable with marginal parameters p, q, where o < p, q < 1, and coefficient of correlation p, then the probability function on (X,X) is given by: 
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and J: TF[y](U)dG(y) is, as a flIDction of u and v,
which is continuous in u, but discontinuous in v.
For simplicity we set p=q. Then, by symmetry, u(t) = vet), and the pair of differential equations (5) reduces to a single 
The equilibrium neutral strategy at the decision instant (t; x,y) is now apparant. If the observation is other than x=y=a 2 , then the decision is: (Sakaguchi [7] ).
For this class of bivariate distributions it is easy (Sakaguchi [S] )to obtain (17) where F2 is the cdf of the maximum of the two iid r.v., each with cdf F.
--
We also have the similar expression forJruTG[xJ(V)dF(X). Now for bivariate uniform distribution put F(x) = G(x) = x for ° ~ x ~ 1.
Substituting this into (17) and considering symmetry, we find that the simultaneous differential equations (5') reduce to a single
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The differential equation (18) Integrating we get 
Integrating (20) One situation, indeed of interest, is the one where the objective of the decision-maker is to maximize the probability of "win" with a given bivariate distribution function. (~be problem in the univariate case was already solved by Sakaguchi [9 J.) One must describe the model as follows : We refer to an observation which is the efficient one so far, that is, there is no observation greater than (in the bivariate sense) the present one among the previous observations, as a candidate. The event in which we accept a candidate which happens to be the efficient one through the whole planning horizon is called a "win". We are asked to fined a stopping policy which maximizes the probability of win. We can derive some dynamic programming equation which will determine the optimal strategy, but the critical difficulty comes from the explosive nature of the underlying state space.
